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By the late 1980s and early 1990s, pioneering members of the U.S. legal 
academy fi nally were able to activate, within the structures of our profession, 
that self-liberating sense of individual and collective consciousness that had 
fueled a (confl icted) understanding of sexual minority-hood among women 
and men with same-sex orientations in the U.S. throughout the twentieth 
century,1 but especially after the 1969 Stonewall Riots.2 
During these decades, lesbian and gay pioneers in the U.S. legal 
professoriate educated and agitated for equality and recognition not only 
in law and policy, but also in legal education specifi cally, including in the 
operations of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS). As outlined 
below, a small group of these pioneers (and allies) had managed by 1983–84 
to establish formally and functionally a “section” of the AALS, and by 1990 
this Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues (and allies) in turn had nudged 
the AALS into adopting a nondiscrimination policy specifying coverage of 
1. For background readings, see JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE 
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970 (1983) (outlining 
the basic social history); CREATING A PLACE FOR OURSELVES: LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL 
COMMUNITY HISTORIES (Brett Beemyn ed., 2013) (presenting a collection of essays focused 
on pre-Stonewall and Gay Liberation Front times); see also Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, 
Queens, and Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 33 (1995) (emphasizing the intersections of sex, gender, and sexuality with 
race, ethnicity, and class).
2. See generally Eloise Salholz et al., Stonewall, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at 56 (providing a historical 
retrospective); William Rubenstein, The Stonewall Anniversary: 25 Years of Gay Rights, HUM. RTS., 
Summer 1994, at 18 (providing a legal and social retrospective); Francisco Valdes, Queer 
Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual 
Orientation,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997) (recounting the emergence of sexual orientation in 
legal culture and academia through doctrine and scholarship).
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sexual orientation.3 Both were historic fi rsts in U.S. legal culture, and each 
established new baselines for the future confi guration and administration of 
legal education in the U.S. 
By the mid-1990s, Stonewall and the nation’s legal academy fi nally had met.
Crucially, in the years since, this section has continued serving as crucible, 
spearhead and vehicle for sexual minority faculty and friends to conduct 
academic and community-building programs in the continuing pursuit of equal 
justice in the legal academy and throughout society. As the history outlined 
below shows, this section provided the means by which sexual minorities 
in legal education mobilized for collective political action, aff ecting both our 
particular workplace environments and profession and our basic normative 
positions in society. Despite the remarkable and tangible progress during the 
late twentieth century, these were times of acute political confl ict and cultural 
backlash, oftentimes focused on the inclusion or exclusion of sexual minorities 
from social and legal frameworks.
By century’s turn, the intensifying cultural clashes and political polarization 
that had gripped and split the nation—the so-called “culture wars”—had spilled 
over into the nation’s legal academy.4 Those dynamics increasingly set the 
zeitgeist, and basic terms of engagement, for our work as a section during those 
acutely confl icted times. Those dynamics have not changed fundamentally 
today, and perhaps have grown worse.
Thus, like so many others before and since, 1997–98 was a year that brought 
with it the best—but also among the worst—of times. 
In many ways, 1997–98 simply continued the pioneering work of earlier 
generations and section members across the U.S. legal academy in pursuing 
sexual orientation justice across legal education generally, and within the legal 
professoriate specifi cally. But that year we broke new ground in the Annual 
Program, held in January 1998, centered on cutting-edge issues focused on 
sexual minorities and in racial and ethnic communities. Yet, high moments 
were met with historically unprecedented lows: legislative and administrative 
attacks specifi cally and viciously targeting our pro-equality eff orts, which 
(surprisingly to us) came directly from very senior levels of the U.S. government. 
Like so many others, this year was indeed one of high highs and low lows.
3. For more detailed accounts, see the Cain & Love (Cincinnati: Before and After, 66 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 460 (2017)), Cox (Time for a Change: 20 Years after the “Working Group Principles, 66 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 531 (2017)), and Leonard (Fortuitously Present at the Creation, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473 (2017)) 
essays in this mini-symposium; see also infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (on early 
sexual minority activism within the legal professorate). In later years, the section name was 
modifi ed to today’s name: Section on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues.  
4. See infra note 6 and sources cited therein (on the backlash politics of the culture wars); see 
also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Kulturkampf[s]” or “fi t[s] of spite”?: Taking the Academic Culture Wars 
Seriously, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1309, 1310–48 (2005) (focusing specifi cally on the culture 
wars’ impact on academia).
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Recalling our Section activities in 1997–98 thus presents both a history of 
and one model for current and future legal academics to pursue an activist 
agenda promoting or protecting equality in the profession.
That year was a period of culture wars, not unlike many since then, including 
right now. It was a period of confl ict and debate in the legal academy as 
well, particularly about the signifi cance of diversity and sameness-diff erence. 
Despite those turbulent crosscurrents, in that year the section succeeded in 
building principled solidarity across diff erence and in vindicating normative 
principles about equal justice among our multiply diverse ranks, by focusing 
on the intersections of race, ethnicity, and orientation in law and society. Now, 
two decades on—and as many of the sexual minority pioneers who broke the 
barriers of entry for the rest of us are beginning, or approaching, retirement 
from our shared profession—is a timely occasion to refl ect, critically and self-
critically, on the forward-looking insights and lessons that might be drawn from 
our recent and continuing histories with social, professional, institutional, and 
systemic forms of privilege and prejudice.
In 1997–98, for the fi rst time ever, the section decided to devote its main 
annual event to the variegated interplay of race, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation in contemporary U.S. law and society. Presenting a diverse panel 
of prominent scholars,5 this program signifi ed a substantive intervention in the 
then-developing fi elds of critical race theory, LatCrit theory, and gay/lesbian 
legal scholarship. As a knowledge production exercise, this multifaceted 
intervention was designed to nudge orientation into the discourses on race 
and ethnicity, as well as to nudge race and ethnicity into the emergent legal 
scholarship focused on the socio-legal condition of U.S. sexual minorities.
But more than to “build bridges” among “diff erent” minorities, the point 
was to highlight how we already constitute overlapping multiple communities. 
Because at the time sexual orientation was coded white while race and ethnicity 
were coded straight, this program was designed to showcase in substantive and 
symbolic terms how race, ethnicity, gender, orientation and similar identity 
constructs already and concurrently populate “diff erent” U.S. communities 
and lives—and to do so precisely in a time of rising anti-equality backlash 
5. Titled “Race, Ethnicity and Sexual Orientation: Crossing New Intersections in Law and Scholarship,” our 
program was co-sponsored by the Section on Minority Groups and featured Angela Gilmore 
of Nova Southeastern as moderator; Elvia R. Arriola of the University of Texas, Barbara J. 
Cox of California Western School of Law, Clark J. Freshman of the University of Miami, 
Peter Kar Yu Kwan of Santa Clara University, Kendall Thomas of Columbia University, 
and Robert S. Westley of Tulane University. Refl ecting our goals that year, the program 
description stated: “Legal scholarship on sexual orientation has proliferated during the past 
several years, while race and ethnicity scholarship continues to develop in the form of critical 
race theory and, more recently, LatCrit theory. However, existing legal discourses about 
race and ethnicity and about sexual orientation sometimes seem unduly unconnected, even 
though each probably can help to illuminate issues of importance to the others. This panel 
brings together a diverse group of scholars to consider the intersection of race, ethnicity and 
sexual orientation, thereby helping to initiate a broader conversation about the interplay 
of these constructs in law and society, and also within queer legal theory and critical race 
theory.”
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using similar ways and means against us all.6 In broad terms, the ultimate 
aim of our 1997–98 section program was to help cultivate a mutual sense of 
substantive, informed, and principled solidarity based on shared values and 
aspirations, and across multiple vectors of diff erence based on history, identity, 
or circumstance, to provide fuel and glue for social justice activism as diverse 
academics facing times marked by intensifying social reaction and legal 
regression. 
Consequently, timing was equally key. 
This intervention—if one recalls that historic moment specifi cally within the 
U.S. legal academy—took place during a time when notions and questions 
of “diff erence” and “sameness” preoccupied much of the progressive wing 
within the legal professoriate, generating doubts about substantive solidarity 
among “diff erent” identity groups across varied social justice issues, which 
stymied coalitional action and, ultimately, social justice progress. During that 
time, within the legal academy the similarly “diff erent” genres of fl ourishing 
scholarship—each focusing chiefl y either on gender, or race, or ethnicity, or 
sexual orientation—oftentimes seemed likewise preoccupied with sameness-
diff erence questions.7 These parallel discursive eff orts oftentimes yielded 
incisive texts relating to one or another identity category, but rarely had our 
respective labors led up to collaborative initiatives to tackle professional, 
institutional, or social injustice.8 It took us the better part of a zigzagging 
decade to begin transcending those paralyzing intergroup dynamics.9 
This program was but part of that long, multifaceted, still-ongoing group 
eff ort.
This academic status quo refl ected the prevailing zeitgeist of the “culture 
wars” during that (and this) time. 
6. To recall a sense of those times, see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Kenneth L. 
Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 677 (1991); Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 1467 (1996).
7. For a sampling, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Diff erence/Deviance 
Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The 
Diff erence It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/
Diff erence Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 296; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 
585–616 (1990); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 
3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995); Symposium, Diff erence, Solidarity and Law: Building 
Latina/o Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO–LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical 
Race Theory and Antiracist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (on race and sexuality).
9. For an overview, see Francisco Valdes, Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and 
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience—RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 
(1999).
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All around us, the politics of reaction against “liberal” legal gains of the 
past century—including those of the Square Deal, New Deal, Fair Deal, Great 
Society and second Reconstruction—seemed to run rampant with ever-greater 
vengeance to resurrect pre-civil rights America, both formally and normatively. 
The result was a contraction of lived justice specifi cally within and among 
communities that traditionally had been excluded from the academy, and 
subordinated across society. Within the legal academy, these politics belittled 
and attacked the very diversifi cation of legal education that, fi nally, had allowed 
so many members of this section an opportunity to practice the profession 
after generations of de jure and de facto exclusions based intersectionally 
on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other similar identitarian 
constructs.10
Equally important, therefore, this program endeavored to help facilitate 
coalitional networks across and among multiply diverse, queer, critical, and 
outsider scholars with a common interest in equal justice. This program was 
designed not only to refl ect but also to project the growing multidimensional 
diversifi cation of the U.S. legal academy generally in terms of gender, race, 
ethnicity, and orientation. More particularly, it also was designed to underscore 
and embrace the homegrown diversifi cation of our section membership 
specifi cally in terms of race and ethnicity that had occurred in the prior years. 
Perhaps most especially, then, this program aimed to recognize and 
build on the pipelining work of earlier section leaders, who proactively had 
recruited section members of color for service on the Executive Committee—
myself included. It is no coincidence that, starting in the 1990s, the section 
increasingly elected more chairs of color.11 Building on this record, in 1997–98 
the section also established a mentoring program, an eff ort driven by the hope 
that sexual minorities newly entering the legal professoriate over time would 
help to make a diff erence for the better in the publications, classrooms, and 
institutions of the legal academia.12
During that time, however, the tensions, gaps, and disorganizing 
uncertainties resulting from the prevalent politics of reaction and our 
own “sameness/diff erence dilemma”13 seemed to inhibit in untold ways the 
10. For an informative historical account of the identity politics shaping legal education’s 
formalization in the U.S. during the nineteenth century and since, including the systemic 
exclusion of blacks, women, Jews, immigrants, and poor persons in favor of “white males”, 
see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 
1980S, 81–102 (1983).
11. Before 1997–1998, the fi rst and only section chair of color had been Robert P. Wasson of 
Suff olk University Law School, in 1993–94.
12. This section eff ort was spearheaded initially by Kellye Testy, whose later career personifi ed 
the vision motivating this program. Just last year, Dean Testy became president-elect of the 
Association of American Law Schools. See Kellye Y. Testy, Presidential Address: Why Law Matters, 
AALS NEWS (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., Washington D.C.), Feb. 2016, at 1; Kellye Y. Testy, 
2016 AALS Annual Meeting Presidential Address: Why Law Matters, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 707 (2016).
13. See Williams and other sources cited supra note 7 (on law, diff erence, identity, and equality).
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potential for coalitional enterprise among various outsider communities, both 
within and beyond the academy. During that time, we were more likely to read 
about confl ict than cooperation among out-group communities in various 
social, political, and economic settings.14 Time and again—as with the steady 
judicial rollback and demonization of affi  rmative action in opinions ranging 
from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke15 two decades earlier to Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena16 only two years earlier—we had seen the raw might of 
legal reaction but had no ready levers of power with which to counteract 
eff ectively, despite all our training and knowledge and privilege; more often 
than not, we had been reduced to mutual exchanges of academic outrage 
while unjust retrenchment marched on in the streets, schools, and squares of 
the country. 
In myriad ways, the powerful combination of reaction and diff erence had 
impeded our capacity as legally trained professionals to act collectively—
collaboratively as a community—in favor of social justice, whether within or 
beyond our own workplace: the legal academy.
And then, not so suddenly, 1997–98 put the stakes and consequences of 
those dynamics and impediments squarely in front of us—as a profession and, 
even more particularly, as a section—when federal policy in the form of the so-
called Solomon Amendments specifi cally targeted us, and our students, with 
classically invidious lawmaking.
It was, recall, a time of great fl ux: the best and worst of times. 
After all, 1997 also had begun on the heels of the 1996 Supreme Court 
opinion in Romer v. Evans,17 and with that historic text still fresh on everyone’s 
minds. Romer, the fi rst progay opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court since the 
cruel year of 1986, had struck down the recently enacted Amendment 2 to the 
Colorado Constitution, which had prohibited any state entity from adopting 
antidiscrimination legal protections covering sexual orientation. Colorado’s 
constitutional ban on the prohibition of homophobia in turn was an expression 
of the more general state of aff airs prevalent during that era, which then was 
still ruled by the Bowers regime; exactly a decade earlier, in Bowers v. Hardwick,18 a 
bare majority of the Supreme Court had upheld a general antisodomy statute 
as applied to same-sex couplings in ringingly laudatory terms. Invoking 
everything from God and Civilization to Democracy and Morality, their 
opining had ushered an era of homophobic license to discriminate, and even 
criminalize, gay people and life with virtual impunity.
14. For one example, see Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National 
Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (1997).
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
17. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In eff ect, if not intent, Bowers had instituted a new open season of 
homophobia across the U.S. social landscape. A decade later, Romer had left 
Bowers intact, but concluded that Colorado had gone too far. For good reason, 
the section’s previous annual program had been devoted to Romer.19
However, the Colorado legislature was not the only institution taking 
advantage of Bowers’ invitation to bash gays under color of law. Congress 
too had gotten into the act, and avidly so: That same decade, Congress had 
decided to retaliate against us, the legal education profession, for endeavoring 
to end sexual orientation discrimination on law school campuses. Enacting 
legislation targeting law schools and law students, the federal government 
now demanded that our profession become complicit in the practice of 
discrimination in our very workplaces. It was eff ectively a demand that we 
reintroduce rank de jure discrimination onto law school campuses. What 
would we do? 
What could we do?
Driven by shared conviction and collective umbrage, that same year the 
section stepped up to the plate, organizing an unprecedented coalitional 
campaign undertaken with and by the AALS, the Society of American Law 
Teachers (SALT) and other groups or individuals, to neutralize or repeal these 
invidious measures. Our aim was to change an act of Congress. Our goal 
was to protect our profession and students from the personal and systemic 
consequences of compelled participation in de jure bigotry. Our means was 
loosely coordinated community action. Despite the fl ashes of tension and 
periods of tedium entailed by this work, the tenacity and teamwork of so many 
“diff erent” actors halted the wholesale betrayal of equal justice then being 
demanded by federal law. 
That campaign entailed a year of public fora, private meetings, lobbying, 
and similar activities that put a premium both on individual initiative and 
responsibility as well as on mutual cooperation and accommodation. During 
the span of that year, many acts by many persons slowly but surely made the 
positive, incremental diff erence—acts ranging from letter writing to public 
protests and discrete behind-the-scenes politicking—undertaken personally, 
yet collectively, by untold numbers of diversely situated individuals. Indeed, 
perhaps the most magical part of those days was the sustained willingness of 
so many “diff erent” folks to collaborate patiently and against all odds to undo 
an unjust law. 
That our motley eff orts succeeded at all was crucial for that pivotal moment 
in the history of our profession. That we succeeded, even in this limited and 
fragile way, shows the latent power of individuals, acting collectively through 
responsive institutions, that always is ours. That we remember those unlikely 
eff orts and imperfect gains today—and learn self-critically from the experience 
for tomorrow—is most important now, and going forward.
19. Titled “Evans v. Romer and Beyond,” that program was organized by 1996–97 section Chair 
Jane Dolkart of Southern Methodist University Law School.
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At issue in 1997–98 was our core normative commitment to equal treatment 
regardless of identity.20 This commitment had found expression as formal 
institutional policy less than a decade before: With this section again leading 
the way, and following the example of over 150 localities with policies 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the House of Representatives 
of the AALS had voted unanimously in 1990 to amend AALS Bylaw 6–4, 
adding sexual orientation to its nondiscrimination policy.21 Subsequently, 
the AALS Executive Committee enacted Regulation 6.19, mandating that 
schools receive written employer assurances of nondiscrimination before 
allowing them on-campus access. Given the times, of course, these policies 
had attracted traditionalist backlash, including the military’s adamant refusal 
to abide by the bylaw regulation. Like any other discriminatory employer, the 
military therefore was barred from recruiting on most law school campuses on 
the basis of its de jure discrimination regarding sexual orientation and gender. 
In response, Congress in the 1990s passed two Solomon Amendments—
so named after their principal sponsoring lawmaker—that threatened 
various types of federal funding to law schools and their parent universities, 
including, most notably, student fi nancial aid. “Solomon I” aff ected Defense 
Department funds, while “Solomon II” aff ected various grant funds from 
various other federal departments, including Education, Labor, and the like. 
Most signifi cantly, Solomon II aff ected fi nancial aid funds that targeted the 
most economically vulnerable law students from coast to coast.
From our perspective, this legislation’s coercive eff ects directly threatened 
two interests crucial to legal education: fi rst, the bias-free environment that is 
the normative ideal in legal education and, second, the availability of federal 
assistance for deserving students who need fi nancial aid to secure a formal 
legal education. Moreover, this legislation was invidious because it eff ectively 
compelled the legal education profession to “choose” between two (sometimes 
overlapping) classes of students—those who needed to fi nance their education 
and those who needed protection from orientation or gender discrimination. 
Considering neither class of student expendable, we chose to resist this false, 
destructive, and arbitrary forced choice. In 1997, neither result was acceptable 
to us because both were unjust to our students—and a stain on our profession. 
Nonetheless, given the importance of federal student fi nancial aid funds, 
the AALS reluctantly amended its nondiscrimination policy to “excuse” on-
campus access specifi cally for the military, only as required by law, and only 
if law schools also concurrently satisfi ed an affi  rmative “duty to ameliorate” 
the eff ects of the military’s on-campus discriminatory practices. Taken by 
surprise, and resistant to change in general, law schools around the country 
had a decidedly mixed record of “amelioration” during the early stages of this 
struggle. Objecting strongly to this misuse of students as policy pawns and 
20. This account is based on personal experience and the two section reports of 1997–98 
referenced below. See infra notes 22–23.
21. For further background on this historic AALS step, see Barbara J. Cox, Time for a Change: 
Twenty Years After the “Working Group” Principles, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531 (2017).
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seeking to avoid law school divisions, the section, together with SALT and 
other groups and individuals, mounted a resistance and repeal campaign. We 
began with information gathering, collectively improvising and developing 
strategies for community action, both locally and nationally, that culminated 
with organized public advocacy to achieve legislative repeal. Along the way, 
in an early example of social media activism, we mounted sustained email and 
Internet-based eff orts to accentuate nimble actions locally while remaining in 
concert nationally. 
It took time, but this loose and diverse combination of labors worked. 
Two years later, in 1999, our campaign successfully removed student 
fi nancial aid from the Solomon Amendments. Our campaign had ensured, at 
least, that our students would not be vulnerable to federal retaliation due to 
our profession’s nondiscrimination commitments. The rest would still be up 
to us.22 Across the country, section members and our many allies celebrated 
our modest gains.
But the proverbial empire promptly struck back, and hard.
After repeal of the fi nancial aid restrictions, the AALS quickly had reinstated 
its full nondiscrimination policy, but the Defense Department then amended 
the administrative rules implementing the remainder of the legislation in a 
way that eff ectively re-targeted student aid funds specifi cally in law schools.23 
Through this Orwellian administrative maneuver, the legal situation had 
reverted to the status quo ante. The AALS then suspended its reinstatement of 
the full nondiscrimination policy pending further legislative, administrative, 
or judicial action. This uneasy stalemate remained the institutional status 
quo until fi nal, complete, and unequivocal legislative repeal of the military’s 
discriminatory policy more than a decade later. In the interim, we sustained 
multiple tactics and strategies to avoid the divisions on law campuses incited by 
Solomon, and to make equality work in legal education despite this insistent, 
intrusive federal interference. 
We then knew, much to our collective chagrin, that we had to dig in for the 
long and indefi nite haul.
To this end, the Section spearheaded the drafting of two major reports 
designed to organize eff ective resistance to these congressional and 
administrative actions for the longer term. The strategy was to isolate, 
highlight and contain the off ending employer’s every on-campus act. The fi rst 
report, dated September 15, 1998, addressed the initial impact of the Solomon 
22. Indeed, our annual program the following year, organized by 1998–99 section Chair Sharon 
Rush  of the University of Florida was devoted to “Solomon II: Progressive Resistance” and 
was designed to help continue the execution and expansion of multifaceted amelioration 
policies and practices by law schools from coast to coast in everyday circumstances and 
for the longer term. This panel featured Clark J. Freshman of the University of Miami 
(moderator), Matt Coles of the ACLU, Barbara J. Cox of California Western, Arthur S. 
Leonard of New York Law School, and Francisco Valdes of the University of Miami.
23. See 32 C.F.R. 216.4 (1997); see also Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 
23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 351 (1998) (reviewing the regulations).
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II amendment on law schools across the country. The supplemental report, 
dated December 15, 1998, analyzed the fi nal federal regulations governing the 
implementation of the legislation and provided a detailed legal analysis for 
law schools to implement with locally-designed actions that avoided risking 
student aid or other funding.24
Refl ecting the mixed bottom lines we had reached, the initial report on 
amelioration concluded with the observations:
As this Report makes clear, this issue is not likely to disappear next year. Law 
schools therefore must respond to this issue with a recognition that it likely 
will require careful attention indefi nitely. All decisions made now should 
include a careful consideration of their long-term eff ects and sustainability. 
In particular, schools need to devise and then institutionalize the means 
and mechanisms by which access will in fact be regulated and by which 
amelioration will in fact be maximized from year to year.
Finally . . . law schools need to collaborate with each other and with the AALS 
to develop alternative strategies to overturn Solomon II. These strategies 
range from the legislative to the litigative, but the bottom-line point is that 
the current situation is likely to remain in place until and unless Solomon II 
is modifi ed or rescinded.25
This bottom line encapsulated our basic situation as the twenty-fi rst century 
was dawning.  
This uneasy anti-gay status quo then prevailed for the next full decade, 
through the Bowers-era policy farce for military recruitment and employment 
commonly called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—that is, until President Obama 
fi nally signed its formal repeal into law, after so much injury to so many, in 
2010.26 
At that point, at last, the U.S. military no longer was an off ending employer. 
For the fi rst time in more than a decade, military employers on campus no 
longer menaced in blatantly conspicuous ways the policy mandate and formal 
promise of “equal opportunity” in our professional workplaces specifi cally, 
and the legal profession generally. The Solomon stalemate of 1997–98 fi nally 
had come to its legal end.
These two reports not only culminated a yearlong process of collaboration 
among section members, other academics, and organizations like SALT 
and AALS on the issue of sexual orientation employment equality, but they 
also served more generally to ready faculty and students for frontline social 
justice controversy—and for action as a community—on policy issues especially 
24. See Valdes, supra note 23, at 388–90 (publishing the two reports together with some additional 
information).
25. Id. at 383.
26. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html?_r=0#. See also, Remarks 
on Signing the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 2010–2 PUB. PAPERS. 1938 (Dec. 
22, 2010).
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germane to law schools nationwide. The diverse coalitional resistance 
campaign that emerged from these actions was part of, and in turn helped 
to set the stage for, future similar responses to social justice issues involving 
race and ethnicity, including our collective professional responses to anti-
affi  rmative action opinions that were just starting to come down the judicial 
pike during those times.27 The experience of that year illustrates in substance 
and process that our capacity for solidarity in community action sometimes 
can produce results that atomized eff orts alone likely never will. 
Those two reports also were the most tangible expression of the many 
activities comprising our repeal and amelioration campaigns and, as such, 
they embodied the results of the many institutional fault lines that our eff orts 
had to navigate in order to succeed at all. 
As an organ of the AALS, our section was bound by the many rules, 
regulations, customs, norms, and politics that comprised the larger organization 
as a whole—an organization with constituent schools that, institutionally, did 
not stand with us then. Although the individuals participating in our eff orts 
were free as such to act according to conscience, whether or not the section 
could act in this or that way institutionally always was a point of much delicate 
deliberation within the AALS. And while the executive ranks of the AALS 
were decidedly cooperative with our section’s campaign, they also vigorously 
guarded the limits that mattered to them—or to elements of the academy 
important to the AALS and supportive of the Solomon Amendments as 
federal policy.
For instance, under AALS rules and customs, the section itself could not 
directly publicize the reports, nor could we list the section as their author. 
Similarly, the AALS prohibited the section from conducting any campaign 
activities, such as distributing buttons and stickers, during the AALS annual 
meeting and related events. Nor, importantly, could the section work publicly 
or “offi  cially” with other professional groups, like SALT, to conduct our 
advocacy campaign more closely and as a coalition. On the whole, the AALS 
vigilantly policed our eff orts, and intervened to stop our planned advocacy or 
actions more than once, even though the association was actually sympathetic 
to the substance of our campaigns. 
Crucially, the AALS executive ranks, then led by Carl Monk, often educated 
us on the formal limits of the situation by hinting at ways that we might 
accomplish our tactical, strategic, or substantive goals while remaining in 
technical compliance. It was a consequential choice of individuals acting within 
and for institutions: While enforcing what the AALS formally prohibited as a 
matter of policy or practice, the AALS oftentimes simultaneously suggested 
ways of doing justice despite entrenched systemic inequities that operated, in 
27. For example, only a few years later organizations like SALT, as well as the legal academy 
in general, were relatively ready for actions that, over time, would infl uence outcomes in 
cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding race-based affi  rmative action 
policies in legal education). SALT, in particular, organized a Grutter-related march in San 
Francisco during the annual meeting of the AALS that exemplifi es those eff orts and times.
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this instance, as roadblocks to equality. In this way, the individuals staffi  ng the 
section and the AALS cooperated, both institutionally and personally, and 
sometimes uneasily, in bridging during those tumultuous years the systemic 
divergence of politically unchangeable policies and sexual orientation equities. 
Under these mixed circumstances, the section became the fulcrum for, 
rather than the instrument of, our coordinated individual actions, including 
the drafting of our reports. The section’s preexisting administrative structure 
quickly and organically became the de facto logistical and informational hub 
for the coordination of local actions at varied schools across the country. 
We became the point of contact and coordination not only for nationwide 
eff orts from within the academy, but also with Congress (through the offi  ces 
of Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Arlen Specter) and with the 
White House (through the offi  ce of John Podesta). And, as the substantive 
program for that year illustrates, the section’s formally permitted activities 
were designed consciously to support our coalitional campaign eff orts 
synergistically.28 Indeed, our section annual business meetings during that 
time were devoted, fi rst and foremost, to open and continuing discussion of 
our ongoing campaigns to ensure both repeal and, in the interim, eff ective 
amelioration.
Thus, although the section itself could not act as such in many circumstances, 
the institutional infrastructure of the section, and of the larger AALS, provided 
both an incubator and a platform for our advocacy to drive the campaigns 
for repeal and amelioration. In this context, the institutional distinction 
between the formal and the actual took center stage. Because of these dynamic 
complexities, and as elaborated further below, our 1997–98 experience with 
Solomon underscored enduring and urgent lessons for today and, signifi cantly, 
for tomorrow—lessons both on the power and on the limits of individual and 
collective action through institutional platforms or channels.29
And so we actually orchestrated the (eventual) repeal of an act of Congress. 
Yes, we did. Despite the postrepeal stalemate that muted somewhat our 
sense of substantive success, our timely solidarity had fended off  compelled 
complicity in on-campus discrimination. And, again, our 1997–98 annual 
program, dedicated to the interplay of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, 
both underscored and propelled the ethics and pragmatics of this kind of 
coalitional work.30 These two moments in our section’s rich and continuing 
history should not be forgotten as we look ahead, for they demonstrated at 
a key moment in the broader history of sexual minorities in legal academia 
that organized academic activism can and does make a diff erence, especially 
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (on the 1997–98 section program).
29. See infra notes 31–44 and accompanying text (on lessons to be drawn from 1997–98).
30. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text (on the section program of that year) and supra 
notes 20–27 and accompanying text (on Solomon repeal campaign); see also Valdes, supra 
note 2 (on the politics and practice of coalition in legal culture and academia across race-
orientation “diff erence”).
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when we take personal initiative and act collectively in principled, proactive, 
persistent ways.
During a time of extended reaction and cultural warfare, when legislation 
and adjudication increasingly again had become chiefl y instruments of 
oppression and subordination, this grass-roots academic activism provided a 
moment of uplift, both immediate and lasting. Though our formal success was 
a solitary, limited, even ephemeral gain, our coalitional struggles cleaved new 
cracks into the edifi ce of legal reaction and its complete entrenchment: Our 
local and national eff orts during and since 1997–98 denied complacent stability 
and mainstream normalcy to the military’s policies and practices against the 
employment of sexual minorities. And this resistance, in turn, helped to keep 
the fi res of queer justice burning within the legal academy during another long 
and cold decade of reaction and bias against our profession and students. In 
our own imperfect and inadequate yet diligent ways, this section and our allies 
were able to mark and help hold the anti-gay equality line, within our profession 
at least, during this diffi  cult decade. Though at best a stop-gap measure, our 
solidarity on this one issue contested retrenchment and discrimination in 
our profession until the nation fi nally began to awake from its homophobic 
torpor, and stirred itself enough to repudiate its own knee-jerk prejudice years 
later. More broadly, and as current events put on regular display, that same 
shamefully belated stirring continues, fi tfully to this day, in the unfolding 
context of formal marriage equality. Most importantly, this tectonic legal shift 
was established against all odds, chiefl y, by the social courage, commitment 
and activism of sexual minorities from coast to coast during these very same 
times.31
This act of remembrance thus brings an important point to the fore: 
Normatively, as well as politically, our stance in 1997–98 fi nally has prevailed, 
even if not yet as a matter of federal law. Even though sexual minorities of 
all stripes still can suff er subordinating discrimination in employment and 
other systems across the country, no longer can we be dismissed wholesale, 
and casually, as self-evidently deformed, perverse, or diseased. As events and 
headlines within and beyond our profession subsequently have made plain, no 
longer does heteronormative privilege enjoy a smug hegemony over matters of 
life and policy ranging from privacy and intimacy, to formal marriage equality, 
to hate crimes protection, to nondiscriminatory military service, and beyond.32
31. For illuminating analyses, see Douglas Nejaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
941 (2011); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT 
Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014); Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When 
Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015).
32. In fact, formal and cultural changes regarding sexual minorities have been experienced 
by U.S. society as so sweeping and rapid that this limited, incomplete progress repeatedly 
has been denominated a “sea change” in legal, social, academic, political, and other 
contemporary discourses. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 107–13, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12–307), 2013 WL 2337935; John Harwood, A Sea Change 
in Less Than 50 Years as Gay Rights Gain Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2013, at A16; Thomas 
Tillery, Sea Change: Planning for Same-Sex Married Couples and the DOMA Decision, 44 TAX ADVISER 
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Our choices and actions as a section and community were not only right 
on principle, but also on the right side of history. But the eff orts and events of 
1997–98 were not unique or singular moments in our ongoing group history. 
Our organized and personal resistance to coerced bigotry in that specifi c 
instance was but one episode in the turning of larger tides, both socially and 
legally. Yet it was an important and instructive episode: Ideally, this forward-
minded retrospection will help embolden us, and future generations of law 
professors, administrators, students, and allies, to embrace antisubordination 
academic activism whenever and wherever we may fi nd ourselves tested by 
similar challenges—as no doubt we still are today, all around us.
This act of remembrance thereby brings into sharp relief perennial lessons 
about law and social change, and about the making of progress through 
collective and personal praxis. This remembrance highlights the distinction 
between—and sometimes the divergence of—legal action and social impact, or 
the lived diff erence between legal reform and social equity. In this way, 1997–
98 recalls and re-centers the social importance of the distinction between the 
formal and the actual.33
1997–98 thereby highlights a bottom line never to be obscured: that formal 
change need not amount to social progress, and that, indeed, too often formal 
legal reform has not amounted, and does not amount, to lived social progress—
or, if so, only marginally, precariously, insuffi  ciently so.34 This remembrance 
shows that normative progress, even if incremental, is what counts—enduring 
culture shifts that produce ever-greater lived justice for multiply diverse 
groups and, especially, for traditionally subordinated communities. This 
lesson underscores that legal reform is a means, that normative progress is the 
constant goal, and that a postsubordination social order must be the shared 
ultimate end of diverse individuals who believe in equal justice for all.
Therefore, this remembrance also should remind us all that progress is 
always, in itself, in process—an incomplete, imperfect, precarious, and infi nite 
process; after all, change, per se, is not progress, and history is never linear. As 
the gyrations of equality’s history in the U.S. make plain, much can change 
legally without any social transformation, or cultural progress, in the long 
642 (2013); Lauren Markoe, Election 2012 Shows a Social Sea Change on Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/2012/11/08/election-2012-
gay-marriage-sea-change_n_2090106.html [https://perma.cc/FH5U-A933].
33. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (on this distinction in the Solomon context of 
1997–98). 
34. For insightful analyses, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178–87 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); John O. Calmore, Social 
Justice Advocacy in the Third Dimension: Addressing the Problem of “Preservation-Through-Transformation,” 16 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 615 (2004).
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term.35 As we know both from history and news, systems of social injustice are 
entrenched, and adaptable to legal reform; moments of change can be illusory 
and increments of progress, if any, remain perpetually contingent.36
As 1997–98 timely underscored, the purpose of our actions must stay 
focused on social impact in the form of progress toward lived justice. We cannot 
forget the law is but the means to an end—a highly contingent and contested 
end: lived justice, across multiple forms of diff erence, for all in a thoroughly 
Euroheteropatriarchal society.
This lesson is of urgent and enduring importance going forward. 
As ongoing history, including our own, demonstrates, the culture wars 
of today—like the colonial systems of conquest, enslavement, exclusion, 
and apartheid of yesterday—target for oppression the multiply diverse 
“Others” constructed through the traditionalist identity politics of systemic 
Euroheteropatriarchy; this ideology simultaneously yet selectively privileges or 
subjugates persons and groups consistently to stratify society structurally and 
materially.37 Although Euroheteropatriarchy conjures and maintains colonial 
and neocolonial hierarchies that produce diff erences and particularities, so 
do they create and maintain commonalities and patterns that co-construct 
identities and hierarchies based on mutually reinforcing notions of race and 
gender, as well as of orientation; despite all particularities, these patterns of 
systematic stratifi cation matter today in systemic, material, and everyday terms 
to the lives and destinies of all Others.
This continuing history underscores, on a daily basis, the bottom-line 
message of our 1997–98 section program, as described earlier: Sexual minorities, 
in addition to appreciating our multiple internal diversities, must recognize 
that history, aspiration, and struggle connect our prospects for justice to 
the continuing historical quests of “other” or “diff erent” groups categorized 
chiefl y by race or gender grasping for a freer future, and, equally important, 
vice versa.38
Therefore, as the neocolonial identity politics of the continuing culture 
wars confi rms daily across the country, U.S. sexual minorities are not the only 
traditionally subordinated group to ignore the critical takeaways of 1997–98 to 
their own peril. During the past century and a half, groups categorized mainly 
35. See supra notes 2, 6, 31, and 34 and sources cited therein (on the vexed dynamics of change, 
progress, backlash, and retrenchment); see also infra notes 39, 41, and 42 and sources cited 
therein (on same). 
36. Id.
37. For a detailed and substantive discussion of Euroheteropatriarchy, see Francisco Valdes, 
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confl ation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” 
in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 324, n. 1148 (1995) (citing sources for further 
readings on Euroheteropatriarchy as identity ideology in law and society; see also Angela P. 
Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 13, 21–23 (2011).
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (on that year’s section program).
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by race, ethnicity, or gender have posted basic equality gains that today’s 
socio-legal landscape makes increasingly plain are in clear, present, and ever-
growing danger.39 This remembrance should, and must, help all advocates of 
lived justice to recall, mutually, that we really do need each other, as well as 
the precious few institutional resources at our disposal, if we are to preserve—
much less advance—the tentative gains of past and continuing struggles in the 
U.S. for social equity in the hard and harder times to come.
And no one should doubt the coming of harder times, for the culture wars 
of the past several decades show no sign of abatement.40
As we all surely have learned by now, reaction, backlash, and retrenchment 
are the collateral consequences of (even the most modest) social progress 
through legal reform. As our Solomon experience made plain then, 1997–98 was 
no diff erent and, as news reports make plain now, neither is today, specifi cally 
for U.S. sexual minorities; and as history in general teaches, neither, likely, 
will be tomorrow. These lessons should teach us—each and all—that social 
progress through legal reform, if not vigilantly and robustly protected, is likely 
to be ephemeral at best. The lessons of this moment in our history should 
thus remind us to constantly question the metrics of progress, and to be—to 
stay—critically “real” in our assessments of power, injustice, identity, groups, 
institutions, and systems in U.S. law and society.41
Moreover, as the skirmish over the Solomon Amendments recounted above 
also serves to illustrate, mainstream institutions that deign to address our 
longstanding justice claims—institutions like, in this instance, academia—are, 
themselves, then targeted for reactionary attack precisely on that basis.42 
39. On race, today’s activist judges have shown unrestrained industry in their undoing of 
voting rights and affi  rmative action. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
(on voting rights); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (on affi  rmative 
action). On gender, the pervasive socio-legal “war against women” speaks for itself. See, 
e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32 L. & INEQUALITY 
1 (2014); Abby McCloskey & Aparna Mathur, Opinion, The Real War on Women, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (June 30, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-
intelligence/2014/06/30/the-real-war-on-women-washington-regulation-and-taxes [https://
perma.cc/N9M6-76T5]; Beth Baker, Fighting the War on Women, MS., Spring/Summer 2012, at 
27. 
40. See supra notes 4 and 6 and sources cited therein (on backlash and retrenchment in society 
and academy).
41. See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (arguing that “racial 
realism” compels both resistance to white supremacy and critical recognition that racial 
hierarchy is socially and structurally “permanent”); see also supra note 35 and sources cited 
therein (on legal reform, social progress, and backlash against change).
42. Modern U.S. history traces this basic line of reaction and attack to backlash against the 
increments of racial or gender justice registered by Brown v. Board of Education (on race), Roe v. 
Wade (on gender) and, now, Obergefell (on orientation). For some mixed personal refl ections 
on the dialectics of legal progress and social backlash, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985); see also 
supra note 29 and sources cited therein (on notions of progress).
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Over the past several decades, this increasingly politicized correlation 
between emergent social outgroups and responsive social institutions has 
fueled the relentless rollback of formal equality gains toward racial justice 
and gender justice that until recently had been thought secure; it has also 
fueled the persistent co-optation, or subversion, of civil society itself as a force 
for, or guardian of, social progress—a co-optation and subversion illustrated, 
attempted, and turned back in the Solomon contestations of 1997–98.43 
At a time when institutions like our section inevitably and continually are 
beleaguered by reactionary national trends, this remembrance should bring 
one key takeaway into sharp relief: It is up to us—collectively and individually—
to make the diff erence, both in sustaining the progressive potential of 
established institutions and in advancing lived justice socially through them. 
In this extended historical moment, when responsive mainstream institutions, 
as well as traditionally subordinated groups, are under intensifi ed reactionary 
assault, both—the vulnerable outgroups and the established institutions—
overlook moments and lessons, like those from 1997–98, only at their (or, our) 
own peril.
Without doubt, then, the decades immediately before and after 1997–98 
increasingly have put a multifaceted premium on our sustained capacity to act, 
or react, personally, collectively, and as a coalition—an essential capacity that 
is exceedingly elusive for traditionally subordinated groups without access to 
established or mainstream institutional platforms and channels. 
As we know from this remembrance, none of the limited, tentative progress 
recounted above would have been possible absent a motley combination of 
individuals improvising together, as a loose-knit group, across time and space. 
But, importantly, these eff orts emerged and were orchestrated within (and 
across) established professional institutional frameworks to catalyze social 
impacts through formal legal reforms rooted in shared principles, values, 
and goals. As we saw during our Solomon experience, access to institutional 
platforms or channels—like the section specifi cally and the AALS or SALT 
generally—repeatedly allowed us to leverage the impact of our individuated or 
collective eff orts beyond what our capacities otherwise permitted.
1997–98 shows that responsive institutional entities not only can leverage 
our capacity to be heard, but also amplify our capacity to endure through the 
ups and downs of contestation, as during the controversy over the Solomon 
Amendments.
This act of remembrance thereby brings to the fore in a timely way the 
importance of institutional frameworks as eff ective platforms, or channels, for 
varied forms of praxis that are both collective and personal. We’ve long known 
that individuals alone can accomplish much, and that individuals working in 
43. As the back-and-forth contestation recounted above illustrates, legal academia was 
intentionally targeted in the 1990s for retaliatory legislation simply for having acted as 
an independent social force, to deprive it of that capacity, and with the specifi c purpose 
of forcing it to enforce bigoted federal policy no matter what. See supra notes 20–26 and 
accompanying text (on the Solomon campaign and outcome). 
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concert even more, but experiences like ours in 1997–98 confi rm specifi cally 
that individuals who can leverage personal initiative and collective action 
through institutional structures are best-positioned to catalyze increments of 
eff ective social progress that, cumulatively, stick culturally. This remembrance 
demonstrates the synergistic potential of all three levels of action—personal, 
collective, and institutional—in loose but intentional tandem, during one 
contested moment in reforming, not only homophobic policymaking 
nationally, but also the legal academy of the U.S normatively.
This remembrance beckons more of the same in the hard and harder times 
before us.
In the end, then, this remembrance foregrounds the combined importance 
of individuals, groups, and institutions in the making of professional and 
social progress; in the end, all three—individuals, groups, and institutions—
are necessary, as the twists and turns of 1997–98 only help to confi rm. Going 
forward, this bottom line thereby calls on each of us, from our respective 
positions of limited capacity, to daily practice coalition-building and 
institution-building as professional and personal projects of lifelong praxis. 
Going forward, this critical and self-critical remembrance should prompt us 
all, as teachers, scholars, administrators, students, and colleagues, to be always 
alert and proactive in cultivating principled relationships of coalition—as well 
as coalitional institutions—much as our section proved to be in the crucial 
contestations of 1997–98.
The ongoing and actionable lessons of 1997–98 thus serve to remind us, 
perhaps mundanely, that both individuals and groups—as well as responsive 
established institutions—matter to the prospects of systemic and normative 
progress through legal reform. The convergence of the three—individuals, 
groups, and institutions—can maximize not only our capacity for timely 
social impact but also our capacity for longer-term lived progress. As the 
coming years approach, this leveraging of collective personal action through 
institutional platforms and channels to achieve a principled substantive result 
provides a recipe that should never be far from our minds and plans. This 
remembrance underscores that what we do in this continual contestation over 
persistent legacies and contingent aspirations can help determine what comes 
next, normatively, formally, and systemically—what “we” do as individuals, as 
sexual minorities, as a section, as the AALS, as a self-critical profession of 
diverse educators.  Looking ahead, the charged and consequential experience 
of those years should remind us to nurture, through thick and thin, the section 
as one unique instrument of self-empowerment and justice praxis for the hard, 
and harder, times to come.
As other essays in this mini-symposium recall and document, the very 
existence of our section is, itself, the result of individual and collective action 
within institutional frameworks.44 As those essays remind us, sexual minorities 
had no recognition, no standing, no section—no formal institutional site, or 
44. See supra notes 3 and 21 and sources cited therein (referencing the essays).
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“safe space” of our own—just a few short years before we needed and mounted 
the sustained organized activism recounted above. As those essays should 
make eternally plain, the existence and viability of our section is not a given, 
an inevitable, functional, and secure feature of the academic landscape. 
It thus takes but little imagination to speculate, now, on how we might have 
fared in 1997–98 without the section’s infrastructure and networks at our ready 
disposal then. Of course, we never can know for sure. Yet given conditions 
of geographic diff usion and institutional atomization that characterize our 
situations as individuals, how else would—could—we have timely mobilized, 
organized, and sustained our personal and collective capacity to act eff ectively? 
What source or center of infrastructure, communication, and coordination 
would—could—we have invoked and counted on? It takes no imagination, at 
least for me, to conclude that the pioneering and preceding eff orts to create 
the section, and to secure AALS acceptance of it, established the necessary 
institutional predicate for our professional eff orts and collective gains—as 
multiply diverse sexual minorities within U.S. legal academia—ever since then.
The ready use of the section allowed us to quickly come together under 
a known and familiar organizational rubric, with preexisting schedules 
of meetings and programs, and thereby to focus on actions rather than on 
basics. The ready resort to the existing resources of the section allowed us to 
quickly seize the substantive and discursive initiative in framing the issues and 
advocacy. Although we had to navigate the institutional limits and politics of 
the AALS, the section served as a spearhead for successful legal reform, and 
a shield for vulnerable constituencies in the interim. From the experience of 
1997–98 we can and should draw a clear understanding that the section is a key 
and necessary—and necessarily limited and insuffi  cient—site of struggle that 
nevertheless merits our constant, and self-critical, care.
Perhaps most specifi cally, this remembrance therefore highlights the 
potential—even if mixed—social justice utilities of institutional sites, like the 
section, during a critical moment in the history of sexual minorities in U.S. 
legal education, and as part of the dynamics of broader social progress. In 
1997–98, the section served as the indispensable crucible to help incubate and 
coalesce the individual actions that helped to generate institutional change 
with continuing social repercussions. And, ideally, increments of formal legal 
change like this one, over time, accumulate to foment larger culture shifts, 
which, in turn, can continue to bend the arc of history toward equal justice for 
all. This is the hope, the plan, the demand, of our history.
It thus bears emphasis, in closing, that these forward-looking lessons apply 
not only to sexual minorities and other vulnerable groups under sustained 
socio-legal attack; going forward, these lessons should be noted as well by 
established institutions, and those responsible for their choices and in/actions. 
We, as a section and community, must use this experience to appreciate the 
value of institutional platforms in ongoing social justice struggles; likewise, 
large systemic institutions, like the AALS and those who control it from year to 
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year and decade to decade, also must take note of the value that sections, and 
eff orts, like ours contribute continually to the profession’s self-stated mission 
and much-vaunted values—and, in broader historical terms, to the march of 
progress itself. As the essays of this symposium illustrate only in part, not only 
must we “from below” take special care to nurture our section and similar 
safe institutional spaces to protect and advance shared values of social justice 
across diff erence, but so too must the AALS itself, and its entities or agents 
“from above.” Not only must we build institutional platforms, like the section, 
from below, but we also must work to hold the AALS and profession to its 
professed social values and institutional commitments.45
If “we” are to benefi t—as an academy and society—from the critical lessons 
of the recent past, we must each and all, from our respective institutional, 
professional, and social positions, take heed of history—and take personal 
responsibility for informed, timely, dynamic and sustained actions that protect 
or advance expressly shared values, such as equal justice. 
Recalling 1997–98 today—as the same furies of backlash continue to envelop 
U.S. law and society without abatement—we consequently, and fi nally, also 
should mark the important, sometimes overlooked, linkage of action to 
remembrance, and of both to liberation. Remembering together the modest, 
fragile gains of 1997–98 today should help make evermore clear to all of us 
why social justice advocates must know and learn from the lessons of the past 
in order to make enduring progress toward a less deranged future. Linking 
remembrance to action should keep us all alert to the synergies of individual, 
collective, and institutional action in the promotion and protection of frail, 
imperfect—yet important—equality gains that establish the baselines for a 
better tomorrow.
The lessons and experiences of 1997–98 do not, and cannot, guarantee 
that individuals acting collectively within institutions can bring about formal 
change that results in social progress. But those lessons and experiences do 
show that the possibilities for advancement remain always perennial; from 
the perspective of back then, the prospects of success were daunting. Still, we 
acted as if not—even though we knew full well they really were. 
As we mark the passage of twenty years since then, the forward-looking 
insights and bedrock lessons to be drawn from our recent and continuing 
experience with social and legal homophobia consequently urge us to be 
mindful of the basics that shape and sustain incremental social progress. 
Individuals, and relationships of solidarity built mutually, deliberately, and 
slowly across and among them from day to day, always matter. These fl uid, 
ongoing relations across multiple sources of diff erence provide the necessary 
cornerstone, and glue, for collective action when the need for it may suddenly 
arise. As 1997–98 put on full display, it is through the resulting, ongoing 
45. This two-part eff ort is made even more important, and diffi  cult, by the corporatization of 
education generally. See generally EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS (Alfi e 
Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., rev. ed. 2002).
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networks of interrelated individuals that, acting in principled concert, we can 
best make established institutions substantively responsive, and thereby can 
enlist them, and their resources, to amplify our presence professionally and 
politically, and to leverage our impact systemically and culturally. 
As tomorrow’s challenges press on today’s generation of multiply diverse 
sexual minority law professors with ever-greater urgency, those 365 days of 
1997–98, with all their trials and tribulations, and through all their highs and 
lows, can and should serve as a salutary reminder of the manifold reasons that 
(and sometimes how) we do this work, qua law professors, still and always.46
46. See generally Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the Wake of 
Global Neo-liberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV 1513 (2011) (setting forth a forward-looking U.S.-based 
but global framework for antisubordination legal work).
